Finally Weighing in on Utah Redistricting

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Here in Utah we’re approaching the end of a months-long ordeal forced upon us (and every other state) every ten years by the Constitution:  congressional redistricting.  And with the results of the 2010 census showing that Utah is entitled to a fourth congressional seat, the stakes are extra high for parties and individual candidates (or prospective candidates — I’m looking at you @CarlWimmer) alike.

In Utah, the ultimate authority to set electoral boundaries rests with the Republican-dominated state legislature, which has created a redistricting commission tasked with recommending a proposal to the general legislative body at the special legislative session set to begin on next Monday, October 3, 2011.  For the last three months (or more), the commission has been travelling all over the state to obtain public input on specific proposals and general principles.

Yesterday morning, September 27, 2011, the redistricting commission met at the state capitol to take action on some proposed maps and to take public input.  I attended — for the first time.  Although things were an hour late in getting underway, it was nonetheless an interesting show once it got going.

Ultimately, the commission adopted a base map — referred to by the straightforward name Sumsion_06_Modified_A — which I don’t particularly like for a number of reasons.  But that’s a post for later this week.  Right now, I want to speak more generally about redistricting, realizing that I’m woefully late to the party.

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One of the reasons redistricting is such a reliably thorny issue is there’s no consensus on what redistricting is meant accomplish.  Is redistricting just about accounting for shifts in population in the years since the last census?  Is it about ensuring meaningful (or more meaningful) electoral competition?  Is it an opportunity to strengthen democratic institutions and community bonds?  Or, more cynically, is it just another opportunity for the more dominant party to consolidate political advantage and a tool for demographically weak geographies (whether urban or rural) to maintain political power out of proportion to population?

Practically-speaking, redistricting is all of these things.  In a more ideal world, however, it is (or should be) about all of the first three and not about the last two.  Redistricting should be a balancing exercise, in which state legislatures meet, at least every ten years, to account for changing demographics and to structure the rules of political competition in ways that ensure elections remain meaningfully contested, democratic commitment is strengthened, and sense of political community is maintained.  Hardly an enviable task . . . which is something we should all keep in mind the next time we criticize (as we often must) the poor souls assigned to the task.

Things become even more complicated because our state legislators aren’t free to balance these three considerations in any way they see fit.  There are some rules that assign preference.

If for no other reason than Supreme Court mandate, one redistricting concern necessarily predominates over the other two:  that there be an equivalency of each man or woman’s vote.  Known more simply as the “One Man, One Vote” doctrine, voter equivalency requires that, at the very least, congressional districts may not be so skewed in population as to meaningfully dilute or concentrate a person’s vote in relation to those of voters in other districts.

While this doesn’t require exact mathematical equivalency in population among districts, it requires that you get pretty darn close, especially when you’re redistricting for congressional seats.  In fact, the Supreme Court has declined to set any safe harbor for population deviation in redistricting (i.e., it has refused to say something like “so long as population deviation is not greater than 1 percent, you’re OK”).  Instead, the Court has left the rule as “you’ve got to get as close to perfect equivalency as possible, unless you have a legitimate concern justifying minimal deviation.”  This essentially tells the state legislators tasked with drawing congressional electoral boundaries that the only time they can be absolutely certain of being immune to challenge is where they draw boundaries with the minimum possible amount of deviation; once they choose to depart from that principle, they enter a realm of uncertainty:  their efforts may be upheld, but they may also be struck down on judicial challenge.

The practical effect of the Supreme Court’s “One Man, One Vote” doctrine is to severely limit the extent that a state legislature can consider other factors in drawing congressional electoral districts.  This is a necessary limitation, given our country’s system of representation and political history.  But some legislatures use this necessary limitation as an excuse to not consider other factors at all, or to give them only the most cursory consideration.  I believe that such an approach is misguided and not mandated by law.

In my opinion, redistricting should be about making individual votes as meaningful as they can be, within the constraints of the “One Man, One Vote” doctrine.  Indeed, the fundamental idea underlying the “One Man, One Vote” doctrine is that skewed population distributions among congressional districts undermine the efficacy of individual votes.  But there are other ways besides population deviation in which the efficacy of a vote can be undermined.  It’s important to remember that even though we vote as individuals, we live in different places and act collectively.  Collective action determined by individual votes means that the efficacy of an individual’s vote can be undermined by the creation of “safe” districts.  It means that the efficacy of a person’s vote can be undermined by the creation of districts designed specifically to exclude opposing viewpoints from having any say in governance.  It means that the efficacy of an individual’s vote can be effectively undermined, or even silenced, as to specific issues, by unnecessarily splitting up connected neighborhoods or “communities of interest,” difficult as those are to define.

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Now, none of this means that a redistricting legislature should pursue these goals without regard to the realities on the ground.  That, too, would undermine the efficacy of individual votes.  Where one governing philosophy or political party predominates over another in a jurisdiction because it has prevailed in the public contest of ideas, redistricting shouldn’t be used to manufacture competition inconsistent with that reality.  But where a more competitive option consistent with the “One Man, One Vote” doctrine exists, it should be pursued over a less competitive option.  Where a more community-friendly option consistent with the “One Man, One Vote” doctrine, exists that should be pursued over an option that cuts apart communities of similar demographic characteristics and historical attachment.  And certainly, either of these are preferable to an option, even if it is consistent with the “One Man, One Vote” doctrine, that unnecessarily undermines both the goals of competition and community.

And if the goals of competition and community can be significantly better served by a small deviation in population among districts, legislatures should be willing to take a small risk and pursue those options, because they are consistent with what I believe should be the underlying goal of the redistricting process — competitive elections, strong democratic institutions, and maintenance of the sense of political community.

Making these judgment calls isn’t easy.  And, when it’s done right, no one is going to be 100 percent happy.  Lines have to be drawn somewhere, and inevitably, they will divide neighborhoods, separate communities, and provide some practical advantage to some candidates over others.  But the fact that no map can be drawn that satisfies everyone isn’t a license to fully embrace redistricting as a tool for political advantage.  Redistricting, frustrating as it is, is extraordinarily important.  It’s about ensuring that people are meaningfully represented in our compound constitutional republic, and it requires the very best good faith efforts of our representatives.

Take that, Ayn Rand: Elizabeth Warren on Taxation and Social Contracts

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There is nobody in this country who got rich on his own. Nobody. You built a factory out there — good for you. But I want to be clear. You moved your goods to market on the roads the rest of us paid for. You hired workers the rest of us paid to educate. You were safe in your factory because of police forces and fire forces that the rest of us paid for. You didn’t have to worry that marauding bands would come and seize everything at your factory… Now look. You built a factory and it turned into something terrific or a great idea — God Bless! Keep a big hunk of it. But part of the underlying social contract is you take a hunk of that and pay forward for the next kid who comes along.

This quote from Elizabeth Warren, Democratic candidate for the Massachusetts Senate seat currently occupied by Scott Brown, ignited a firestorm of controversy in the Blog- and Twitter-spheres.

It’s no wonder its been popular and polarizing.  Warren articulates the argument for disproportionate taxation as well as any major candidate has for a while.  And she does a great job of countering people who seem to take Ayn Rand seriously when she suggests that there are people in this world who are unilateral successes owing nothing to the fearful masses who’ve been holding them back.

And even though Warren’s quotation doesn’t speak to the more relevant question of whether it’s fair to tax the rich at a greater level than the poor, and, if so, to what greater extent, it’s nonetheless powerful rhetoric that you’re going to hear quite a bit in the months leading up to Election 2012.

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It’s powerful rhetoric because she doesn’t talk about “paying your fair share,” she doesn’t talk about the ability to “afford it,” she doesn’t talk about “shared sacrifice,” she doesn’t even talk about “math.”  Instead, she talks about the “social contract” and about “paying it forward for the next kid who comes along.”

This implicates what is to me an obvious truth that a lot of people seem to miss:  Everyone stands on other’s shoulders to get to wherever it is that they go, and continue to draw on that support once they’ve gotten there.  Warren’s rhetoric shifts the grounds of the debate from “tax the rich more because they can afford it,” to “tax the rich more because they can afford it and because they owe it to the rest of us who put them where they were.”  It’s a subtle shift, and still smells like a bit of class warfare, but it’s optimistic and non-villanizing, and has the potential to be very powerful and effective, especially in a climate where: (1) people are struggling to survive economically, (2) because of a crisis caused (in the eyes of many) by a Wall Street gone wild.

Conservatives have effective responses to Warren’s statements, but, at the very least, Scott Brown has a formidable political for in Massachusetts and the Democratic Party has found an effective spokesman.

Some Thoughts on Obama’s Deficit Plan, Class Warfare, and Equal Protection

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President Obama unveiled his much-anticipated deficit reduction proposal yesterday, which included significant proposed tax increases on wealthy Americans.  Republicans immediately responded, with people from Rush Limbaugh to Representative Paul Ryan calling the plan “class warfare” designed to “score cheap political points.”  President Obama’s campaign manager, Jim Messina reacted yesterday evening:

This proposal makes sure millionaires and billionaires share the responsibility for reducing the deficit. It would correct, for example, the fact that Warren Buffett’s secretary currently pays taxes at a higher rate than he does.

The other side is already saying it’s “class warfare” — that’s their rhetorical smokescreen for providing millionaires and billionaires special treatment.

As the President said this morning, “This is not class warfare — it’s math.”

The wealthiest Americans don’t need further tax cuts and in many cases aren’t even asking for them. Requiring that they pay their fair share is the only practical way forward.

The Republicans are accusing Obama of singling out the wealthy for  (negative) unfair treatment.  Obama is accusing the Republicans of singling out the wealthy for (positive) unfair treatment.  Each side claims that all they want is for everyone to pay his or her fair share.

Both sides are arguing over a question that all constitutional lawyers are very familiar with:  What does it mean to treat people equally?

Although I don’t know that it provides a good answer for the questions raised by both sides about progressive taxation, which, like many others, remain, fundamentally, ideological and policy issues, I think that the Supreme Court’s approach to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause offers some insight into the debate over the allegations of class warfare (and can I just say that class warfare is way over the top — evokes too much Marx, Lenin, and Communism — much better to talk about “political motivations” versus “search for solutions”).

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Equal Protection Analysis — Goal and Method

When an equal protection challenge is mounted against a law, the substance of the claim is that “the legislative majority passed a law treating us differently just because they don’t like us.”  The legal analysis reflects the nature of the claim:  The fundamental aim of all the complicated legal tests employed by a court in an equal protection case is to help the court determine what motivated the legislature to pass the challenged law.  In order to determine this, a court examines (among other things) (1) the problem the law seeks to solve, (2) the reasons given for treating people differently, and (3) the extent to which there are viable alternative solutions to the problem that would treat people more equally.

If the law is directed at a truly important problem, a reviewing court will recognize that the law is, all things considered, less likely to be motivated by personal animus — after all, there’s a pressing need that the law id addressed toward.  And the court is more likely to cut the legislature some slack (motivationally-speaking) to deal with the issue.  Likewise, if there are good reasons for treating people differently, the court is less likely to assume that the law was motivated primarily by the majority’s dislike of any particular group.  And, finally, if there is no other reasonable avenue for solving the problem, a court is more likely to assume that the law really was directed at the problem or even give the legislature a little more flexibility when the question of motivations is in doubt.

Now, I want to be clear and say that I don’t think progressive taxation is inconsistent with equal protection, but I do want to take a minute and examine Obama’s deficit reduction methods using the analytical tools for equal protection claims to determine whether there’s really any bite to Republican claims of politically-motivated class warfare.  Again, we’re just using these tools to do a bit of searching for motivations — not a full-blown constitutional analysis.

Seriousness of the Problem

Obviously, the problem the President Obama’s plan seeks to solve is undoubtedly a serious one.  The so-called Great Recession and the efforts of the Tea Party have finally gotten everyone to acknowledge that our current spending path is unsustainable and that debt reduction, is, at least in the long term, a matter of national security.

Characteristics Justifying Differential Treatment

There also may be good reasons for the differential treatment of wealthier Americans, among them being that they are the true “winners” in our economic system and that their wealth is created primarily by the efforts of those who are most in need of the social services our limited welfare system provides.  Whether you agree with these points or not, they provide potentially legitimate (read: not personally discriminatory) grounds upon which President Obama could base his proposal for more differential treatment.

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Availability of Alternatives

The rub, in this case, as in many, many others, in the questions of alternatives — are there other reasonable options that President Obama forwent in order to adopt his specific policy proposal?  When the question is whether to strike a law down as unconstitutional, courts have to be very careful here, as they run the risk of dictating a specific policy options to legislatures — something far beyond the competency of unelected federal judges.  But when, as is the case for us here, one is just evaluating the question of motivations, you can safely scrutinize alternatives a bit more closely.

Did President Obama have other, more less discriminatory (used in the word’s non-pejorative sense) alternative revenue options?  Without question.  But that doesn’t necessarily end the analysis, as there are a few other considerations that play into this analysis beyond just “what other possibilities were out there?”  For example, which of all the alternatives are politically feasible, and how do the times frames of the different options compare?  To give much stock to a reasonable alternative, it has to actually be (1) viable, and (2) equivalent.  So, were there other viable and equivalent solutions out there?  I think there were, and I refer you to this article by David Brooks of the New York Times for some general thoughts on the subject.

In Conclusion

So, what have we gotten out of all this?  As far as President Obama’s deficit reduction proposal, it probably tells us that his choice of alternatives is about both solutions and politics — hardly surprising.  Is it class warfare?  Hardly, though I think it’s safe to say that this proposal is probably more about politics than it is about deficit reduction.

But the real purpose of this post was to offer some of  you non-lawyers a different (and helpful) way to look at legislation — and hopefully that’s been a bit more insightful.

Judge Conner of the Third Circuit District Court Weighs in on Obamacare, in a Judicially Modest Way

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Another Obamacare decision was released today, this one at the district court level in the Third Circuit:  Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dept. Health & Human Servs.  This latest decision, striking down the individual mandate as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority, was authored by Judge Christopher C. Conner, a George W. Bush appointee,  and is, in my view, high-quality legal analysis that improves on the initial district court decisions (and some of the appellate level opinions) addressing the constitutionality of Obamacare.  This is not surprising, as Judge Conner had all the previous decisions to draw from and consider when drafting his opinion.

[adsenseyu2] As you might expect, much of Judge Conner’s analysis is duplicated in prior opinions and need not be rehashed here.  But there are a couple of interesting aspects to his opinion that I wanted to highlight.  Feel free to post your thoughts as comments using the form below.

1.  Careful Emphasis on Judicial Role

Throughout his opinion, Judge Conner was careful to note that it was his job, as the spokesman for an inferior federal court, to assess how far the United States Supreme Court had taken the Commerce Clause and take it no further than was clearly justified.  Somewhat paradoxically, he began by noting that past Supreme Court precedent was not particularly helpful:

Given the unique factual circumstances of this case, both the Bachmans and the government can effectively distinguish Commerce Clause jurisprudence that appears unsupportive of their respective positions. Therefore, the Supreme Court decisions in Wickard, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich provide only limited guidance for the court’s analysis. Quite simply, this is a case of first impression.

Having determined that Obamacare presented unique legal questions not squarely addressed by prior Supreme Court precedent, Judge Conner turned to the decisions of the various Courts of Appeals that have split on the constitutionality of Obamacare’s individual mandate and to his own analysis of the relevant constitutional questions.

Ultimately, Judge Conner determined that nothing in Supreme Court precedent or the text of the relevant constitutional provision itself went so far as to mandate (pun intended) upholding Obamacare’s individual mandate as a constitutional exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority.  Essentially, he said:  ”Until the Supreme Court says this is constitutional, I’m not going to step out on a ledge and say so.”  Here are some quotes from his opinion:

As set forth below, this Court’s ratio decidendi is straightforward: Heretofore, the Supreme Court has never sanctioned, under the auspices of the Commerce Clause, the enactment of a broad scale economic mandate in anticipation of a probable but uncertain future transaction. The Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence does not lend itself to such an expansive interpretation. Until the Supreme Court interprets the commerce power to permit these anticipatory mandates, I am bound by stare decisis to conclude that Section 5000A is unconstitutional.

Thus, both decisions spotlight the individual mandate’s voyage into unchartered territory of constitutional law. Whether the extension of power is logical or appropriate, the fact of the matter is that Commerce Clause jurisprudence is bereft of authority clearly permitting the extension.

This court’s interpretation of existing precedent, including Lopez and Morrison, leads the court to the conclusion that the Supreme Court would not construe the Commerce power to have such expansive reach. The extension of the Commerce Clause in the manner the government suggests is unsupported by precedent and therefore beyond the scope of this court’s proper function to grant.  An expansive interpretation of the commerce power that will permit Congress to equate the individual financial decision to forego health insurance with commercial activity having a substantial effect on interstate commerce, must come from the Supreme Court.

It would be uncharitable (and inaccurate) to say that Judge Connor simply punted and said, “I’ll leave it for the Supreme Court to address the issue.”  He ultimately reached his own conclusions about how he thought the Supreme Court was likely to rule given his reading of precedent.  But there’s no doubt he crafted his opinion very carefully and that, in addition to how he may have felt as to the merits of the challenge himself, he felt uncomfortable as a lower-tier federal judge (though obviously a very able one) in unilaterally extending the commerce clause based on his own reading of the text and marginally-applicable precedent.  This is an effort in judicial modesty that does the federal judiciary proud, in my opinion!  And lawyers should pay attention — this strikes me as something that can be a very persuasive approach to argument that can win you a lot of cases.

2.  Response to Anti-Obamacare Hyperbole

The second aspect of Judge Conner’s opinion that’s quite notable is his approach to what he obviously considered to be hyperbole in the plaintiffs’ arguments (though he more charitably identified it as overstatement accompanying “zealous advocacy” in a footnote).  Judge Conner himself rejected the contention, which we hear so often, that upholding Obamacare would necessarily lead to either (1) laws mandating broccoli consumption, or (2) acceptance of the constitutionality of laws mandating broccoli consumption.

Judge Conner specifically noted that he himself had no doubt that the market for healthcare was unique and that it was entirely possible to craft a constitutional standard that could distinguish between a health insurance mandate and a broccoli consumption mandate — he just refused to be the one to do it:

It is clear to the court that the health care services market is unique. In other markets, including other insurance markets, when an individual suffers a loss or is in need of a commodity or service (such as food, transportation, or housing) there is no obligation that society compensate for that loss or provide the commodity or service without advance payment. In the health care services market, however, against the backdrop of state and federal laws such as Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, individuals can and do receive medical treatment regardless of their ability to pay.

Uniqueness as a limiting principle presents the court with a wholly novel question in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The text of the Constitution itself does not admit such a limiting principle. Moreover, the court has been unable to find any precedent, and the parties have been unable to direct the court to any precedent, that permits the expansion of the Commerce Clause authority to regulate individuals prior to their engagement in commercial activity on the basis of the unique nature of the market being regulated. This court is bound by the principles of stare decisis and must reasonably interpret, not create, law.  This court’s interpretation of existing precedent, including Lopez and Morrison, leads the court to the conclusion that the Supreme Court would not construe the Commerce power to have such expansive reach. The extension of the Commerce Clause in the manner the government suggests is unsupported by precedent and therefore beyond the scope of this court’s proper function to grant.  An expansive interpretation of the commerce power that will permit Congress to equate the individual financial decision to forego health insurance with commercial activity having a substantial effect on interstate commerce, must come from the Supreme Court.

The Framers carefully constructed our national government with a system of checks and balances. This court’s role in that system is to assess the matters presented before it on the basis of the constitutional text and Supreme Court guidance, consonant with the principles of stare decisis. The minimum coverage provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The court does not reach this conclusion because the alternative would be disastrous to this nation’s future, such as the Bachman’s prediction of America evolving into a socialist state. These suggestions of cataclysmic results stemming from Article III authorization of an individual mandate are both unproductive and unpersuasive.  Should the Supreme Court determine that the Commerce Clause extends to anticipatory mandates, or, that the health care market is unique for purposes of Commerce Clause analysis, the Supreme Court will delineate clear limits to that power. Until that occurs, the minimum coverage provision of the Patent Protection and Affordable Care Act cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.

Some Thoughts in Conclusion

Ultimately, I suspect Judge Conner’s decision will polarize people a bit, even though it shouldn’t.  There will be some that will view him as equivocating, trying to avoid meeting the issue head on by saying, “The mandate’s not all evil, but I don’t have authority to uphold it at this point.”  Others, like myself, will really like his approach, even if they don’t necessarily agree with all his analysis.

This is a very carefully considered decision that deserves a close read.  Once you’ve reviewed it, I’d love to hear your thoughts.

Lessons in American Constitutional History, Post-1787: Volume 2 — Some Thoughts on The Fourteenth Amendment

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Despite the noise coming from groups like the Article I Society and Tea Party constitutional federalists, the center of American constitutional law is not Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution — it’s the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment — more accurately, in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment — ratified nearly 80 after the drafting of the original document.

As a friend recently told me, the Fourteenth Amendment is (thus far, anyway) the culmination of the American and English constitutional traditions; it’s the true protection for individual rights that was only foreshadowed by even the most significant of the amendments contained in the Bill of Rights.

I’ve quoted Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment before and I’ll continue to quote it again.  Here’s what it says:

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Now, I’m no Fourteenth Amendment expert, and I’m not here to give a detailed history, but I do want to take a few minutes and offer some of my thoughts on what it does and why it matters so much.

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One way of looking at the Fourteenth Amendment is that it simply takes the restrictions on Congress found into the Bill of Rights and applies them to the states, adding the additional requirement of equal protection.  This view, though not altogether wrong, doesn’t really capture the full essence of the sea change that the Fourteenth Amendment wrought in American constitutional law, for a number of reasons.

First, it seems to suggest that the Equal Protection Clause is a little bit of an afterthought, which couldn’t be further from the truth.  As even a casual observer of constitutional law can tell you, equal protection is the primary ground on which most constitutional battles are fought today.  It’s an incredibly significant addition that has helped frame the debate over many of the most important constitutional and societal questions of the last 100 years.

Second, unlike the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted at a time when judicial review was an acknowledged fact, and, as such, amounts to a clear, intentional, and fundamental realignment of the relationship between the national and state governments.  Even if, at the time of the Founding and prior to the Civil War, the (a?) primary concern of those who drafted the Constitution had been preserving the sphere of sovereignty of the states from encroachment by the national government, since the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment it is clear that the foremost constitutional concern was the rights of individuals and not the sovereignty of the states.  Indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment made clear made clear that restrictions on government power are real substantive limits on what government can do, and not just guidelines about where certain laws must originate.

Finally, and although this one may not get much press, it is the Fourteenth Amendment that has ultimately resulted in infusing the Due Process Clauses with content.  This one deserves a separate post all its own (and will get one if my schedule allows), but suffice it to say the clear import of what the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to accomplish, combined with a very limited Supreme Court interpretation of the amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause in the Slaughterhouse Cases forced some arguments onto a more awkward ground and gave us what we refer to today as substantive due process.

So, in all the Constitution-reading that goes on these days, take some time to move beyond Article I and the Bill of Rights, and spend some time with the Fourteenth Amendment, the cornerstone of America’s Second Founding.

Is There Anything to All the Certainty Rhetoric?

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One of the Congressional Republicans’ main talking points over the last year has been to emphasize how “uncertainty” is killing any chances of economic recovery.  The “businesses need certainty” talking point has become a trendy Republican position.  It played quite well in the debate over whether to extend the Bush tax cuts last winter and has been employed more recently in conjunction with Republican criticism of the fact that the Democrats’ failure to propose a budget:

RT @: Reminder: #778Days have passed since Senate Democrats last passed a budget for the federal government. #WorstJobsPlanEver
@SenMikeLee
Mike Lee

Even Jon Huntsman, that most moderate of moderates, has focused in on uncertainty when discussing the economic challenges confronting the good ole USA.  The rhetoric all suggests that if President Obama provided “certainty” the economy would improve.

But how much substance is there really to all the focus on uncertainty?  And to what extent has “uncertainty” come to mean nothing more than lack of confidence:  ”Gee, I don’t want to move until I know whether the economy’s going to improve”?

If that’s all “uncertainty” is, then there’s nothing insightful or significant about all the rhetoric.

But it could mean more.  There’s a kind of uncertainty still lingering from the economic crisis months of late 2008 and late 2009, and it continues to deserve our focus.  It’s a type of uncertainty that accompanies moral hazard — though not equivalent to it — and is one of the less-discussed consequences of a too big to fail, bailout culture.

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When the federal government steps in to save a company because it has been deemed too big to fail, the most obvious consequence (aside from the immediate fiscal ramifications) is that the government provides some level of encouragement for similar behavior in the future.  We worry that companies going forward might be less responsible, and even purposefully irresponsible, in order to make themselves part of the circle of indispensable companies.  Whether this consequence alone justifies avoiding bailouts is a difficult question; it may, or it may not, depending on the specific circumstances.

But lingering in the shadows is another consequence — whether it’s particularly significant, I’m not sure.  Consider the perspective of the business owner committed to playing by the rules, without the means to become too big to fail or subject to the temptation to moral hazard.  They are left to wonder what the rules really are.  Indeed, this hypothetical business owner has to consider competition from two directions:  (1) from businesses who play by the stated rules, and (2) from businesses who don’t play by the rules.  Our hypothetical American dreamer can no longer rely on market consequences to weed out the businesses in the second category, because, apparently there is a separate set of crisis rules that nobody yet knows and that people can only guess about.  Thus, even business owners who don’t embrace moral hazard suffer as a result of the uncertainty that it creates.

Consider a second example:  The hypothetical investor trying to decide whether to bet on or against boom industry.

How significant is this type of uncertainty?  I have no idea.  But it is what I think about when I hear Republican candidates talk about uncertainty.  Because other than a general lack of confidence in our economic performance, I don’t see any other type of uncertainty to be concerned about.

Your thoughts?

Bachmann — Federal Constitution Prohibits State Insurance Mandates

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At today’s Palmetto Freedom Forum debate, sponsored by the good Constitutional Reverend Senator Jim DeMint, Republican Presidential candidate Michele Bachmann ratcheted up the constitutional political rhetoric with a claim that, not only does the federal Constitution preclude Congress from enacting a health insurance mandate, it precludes state governments from mandating health coverage as well:

I believe it is also unconstitutional for states to mandate as a … condition of citizenship, that an individual would have to purchase a product or service even at the state government’s behest.

When pressed about the constitutional authority for her statement, Bachmann said only that she believed it was “inherent in the Constitution.”

As Mitt Romney has discovered, Republican voters aren’t just upset about Obamacare because it was done by the wrong entity — though they employ this argument freely — they hate the idea of a mandate, period.  Yet, up till today, all of the major Republican contenders have been content to fight the state-level battle on old-fashioned policy grounds , without invoking all the constitutional rhetoric.

There are good reasons for this, as the two potential grounds for Bachmann’s position are fraught with some uncomfortable logical and ideological consequences.

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Option 1:  The Dormant Commerce Clause

First, by claiming that a state health insurance mandate was “inherently” prohibited by the federal Constitution, Bachmann could be arguing that state laws mandating health insurance coverage violate the Constitution’s so-called Dormant Commerce Clause.  The Dormant Commerce Clause is a wholly-judicial creation designed to be a mirror image of the affirmative authority granted to Congress over interstate commerce (per Wikipedia):

The Commerce Clause expressly grants Congress the power to regulate commerce “among the several states.” The idea behind the Dormant Commerce Clause is that this grant of power implies a negative converse — a restriction prohibiting a state from passing legislation that improperly burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce. The restriction is self-executing and applies even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute.

For you judicial types out there, the Dormant Commerce Clause is the constitutional equivalent of field preemption.  While states are ordinarily viewed to possess the authority to legislate in the absence of inconsistent federal legislation, the Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from legislating in certain ways even when Congress has not passed any inconsistent statutes.  Why?  I suppose it’s because the Supreme Court assumes, at least when it comes to interstate commerce, that the constitutional grant of authority to Congress is conflicting authority that says, in effect, to the states:  ”Not only can Congress legislate to correct interstate commercial messes created by inconsistent state regulations, the states lack the authority to create some of those messes to begin with.”  This is not the case with most other Article 1, Section 8 powers.

So, why haven’t Republicans embraced the Dormant Commerce Clause as a tool in the fight against state-level government-run healthcare?  I can see three good reasons:

1.  I think it’s pretty clear that the doctrine, as formulated by the Supreme Court, wouldn’t prohibit states from enacting health insurance mandates.  It’s just a losing argument.  But that hasn’t always stopped determined advocates — in both parties — from making politically palatable losing arguments part of their stump speech.

2.  The Dormant Commerce Clause is a judicial creation that appears nowhere in the Constitution.  And it’s just really sad for die-hard originalist, anti-Supreme Court types to rely on a judicially-created constitutional doctrine to make their case.  This is post 1787, after all.

3.  Reliance on the Dormant Commerce Clause creates a troubling logical corollary for those convinced of Obamacare’s unconstitutionality.  If the Constitution precludes the states from passing a health insurance mandate on the ground that the authority to do those types of things is reserved to Congress . . . then Obamacare is constitutional.  Game over.  Checkmate.

So, let’s give Bachmann the benefit of the doubt and assume she wasn’t talking about the Dormant Commerce Clause.

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Option 2:  The Due Process Clause

It’s more likely Bachmann’s statement was based a different ground.  The constitutional guarantee of due process of law, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, could provide the basis for her contention that states are unable to enact a health insurance mandate.  The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit governments from depriving people of “life, liberty, or property,” without “due process of law.”

Although most straightforwardly applicable to procedural guarantees in courts of law, there is a long tradition, both in this country and England, America’s primary constitutional wellspring, of viewing the constitutional guarantee of due process as more than just an assurance of proper procedural safeguards, but also as a substantive protection of fundamental rights.  The substantive component of the guarantee of due process is called, not surprisingly, substantive due process.  Substantive due process is the basis for United States Supreme Court striking down statutes criminalizing abortion and homosexuality.

The primary benefit of the substantive due process approach to the fight against government healthcare is readily apparent — by putting a health insurance mandate outside of the legislative domain entirely, conservatives avoid the most significant problem associated with the federalism/dormant commerce approaches:  The possibility that all the constitutional battle over Obamacare gets them is 50 separate government-run healthcare schemes, instead of a single one.  But in avoiding this problem, the substantive due process approach creates some other issues.

First, it forces conservatives to make some awkward distinctions.  For example, if state health insurance mandates are prohibited by the Constitution, what about automobile insurance mandates (and please spare me the arguments about how driving a car is “optional”)?  Second, and more importantly, the substantive due process approach would require conservatives to embrace the same judicial doctrine used to justify the current constitutional right to an abortion.  Just as conservatives have argued for years that, “The Constitution says nothing about a right to an abortion,” liberals are sure to respond to Bachmann, “Where is the constitutional right to be free from economic mandates?”

In fact, this is precisely how the Roosevelt Administration responded when conservatives argued, 75 years ago, that individuals and businesses had a constitutional right to be free from troublesome social welfare legislation like maximum hour and child labor laws.  It was conservatives’ insistence in pursuing the constitutional solution to state social welfare legislation that led to the Supreme Court abandoning economic substantive due process in a string of decisions that arguably culminated with that Tea Party favorite:  Wickard v. Filburn.  Sensing a troubling pattern here?  Conservatives should (and most do).  If nothing else, history counsels trying something new this time.

So, which is it, Candidate Bachmann — dormant commerce or substantive due process — that prohibits Romneycare and other state solutions?

I predict the Bachmann team begins an orderly retraction of this statement starting in 3, 2, 1 . . . .