Some Follow-up Thoughts on the Significance of the Tenth Amendment and National Government

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* This post is a follow-up to a brief post on the Tenth Amendment from last summer.

In the months between Abraham Lincoln’s election and the start of the Civil War on April 12, 1861, Americans became embroiled in something of a philosophical conversation about their relationship to their own national government.  Was the American Union nothing more than a collection of states — a “club,” so to speak, that states voluntarily joined and could leave at any time and for any reason?  Or was it something more — a creation of the people designed to perpetuate intact despite the desires of the people of any one state?

Abraham Lincoln addressed this issue in his First Inaugural Address as follows:

It is seventy-two years since the first inauguration of a President under our National Constitution. During that period fifteen different and greatly distinguished citizens have in succession administered the executive branch of the Government. They have conducted it through many perils, and generally with great success. Yet, with all this scope of precedent, I now enter upon the same task for the brief constitutional term of four years under great and peculiar difficulty. A disruption of the Federal Union, heretofore only menaced, is now formidably attempted.

I hold that in contemplation of universal law and of the Constitution the Union of these States is perpetual. Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all national governments. It is safe to assert that no government proper ever had a provision in its organic law for its own termination. Continue to execute all the express provisions of our National Constitution, and the Union will endure forever, it being impossible to destroy it except by some action not provided for in the instrument itself.

Again: If the United States be not a government proper, but an association of States in the nature of contract merely, can it, as a contract, be peaceably unmade by less than all the parties who made it? One party to a contract may violate it—break it, so to speak—but does it not require all to lawfully rescind it?

Descending from these general principles, we find the proposition that in legal contemplation the Union is perpetual confirmed by the history of the Union itself. The Union is much older than the Constitution. It was formed, in fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774. It was matured and continued by the Declaration of Independence in 1776. It was further matured, and the faith of all the then thirteen States expressly plighted and engaged that it should be perpetual, by the Articles of Confederation in 1778. And finally, in 1787, one of the declared objects for ordaining and establishing the Constitution was “to form a more perfect Union.”

But if destruction of the Union by one or by a part only of the States be lawfully possible, the Union is less perfect than before the Constitution, having lost the vital element of perpetuity.

It follows from these views that no State upon its own mere motion can lawfully get out of the Union; that resolves and ordinances to that effect are legally void, and that acts of violence within any State or States against the authority of the United States are insurrectionary or revolutionary, according to circumstances.

And going back approximately four score and seven years, James Madison, in Federalist 45, spoke on the subject in response to Antifederalist concerns about how adoption of the Constitution would affect the rights of states:

Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was the American Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that the governments of the individual States, that particular municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of power and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty? We have heard of the impious doctrine in the old world, that the people were made for kings, not kings for the people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the new, in another shape — that the solid happiness of the people is to be sacrificed to the views of political institutions of a different form? It is too early for politicians to presume on our forgetting that the public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of government whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object.

It took a bloody Civil War over the extension of slavery to enshrine Lincoln’s vision of a Constitution that created a perpetual union and placed the states in a position clearly inferior to the national government of the people.  But though you might think the issue was conclusively settled in 1865, if you listen carefully, you’ll hear echos — some subtle, some not so subtle — of the controversy persisting today.

Arguments about states rights, federalism, and even overregulation, have roots in the ongoing debate over the nature of the Union created by the Constitution.  So is the (somehow) revived debate about the merits of state nullification of federal law.

Ultimately, the Constitutional language and the history are ambiguous enough on this matter (as on many others) that it’s impossible to know exactly what the Framers intended when they created the Constitution.  Almost certainly, they collectively had a number of intentions, and even more certainly, some of them changed their minds over time about just what it was they had done.  And whatever intentions were for America at the start, the whole American experiment was substantially redone in the 5 years following the end of the Civil War.

But despite the general ambiguity, we do have some clues.  And, one of those clues is, I think, the 10th Amendment.

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

The 10th Amendment speaks conclusively about the reservation of powers not delegated to the national government–but it speaks ambiguously about to whom the non-delegated powers are reserved:  ”to the states respectively, or to the people.”

The Articles of Confederation contained a similar provision to the 10th Amendment, which stated:

Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.

While its Articles of Confederation equivalent is written in the active voice, from the perspective of a state, the 10th Amendment is fully passive.  The 10th Amendment is also less agressive in that it does not expressly declare each state’s independence and sovereignty, and omits the word “expressly” when referring to delegated powers (presumably to comport with the existence of the Necessary and Proper Clause in the Constitution).  Finally, the 10th Amendment speaks about “the people,” whereas the Articles of Confederation provision referred only to states.

As an aside, Wikipedia — citing an article by Henry Rollins (!) describing his visit to the National Archives in Washington D.C. – asserts that the phrase (“to the people”) was added to the 10th Amendment as a handwritten edition as the draft amendment circulated between houses of Congress . . . suggesting, I’m not sure what, exactly.  But it is fascinating.

I’ve long been puzzled by the existence of the “or to the people” clause of the 10th Amendment.  What should we make of it?

If it was the states that formed the Constitution, and therefore the states that delegated power to the national government, why mention the people at all?  If it was the people, as a national whole, who formed the national government and delegated its powers, why mention the states?  Maybe the drafters and ratifiers of the 10th Amendment (and we should remember, we’re technically talking Congress in 1791, not the Constitutional Convention) conceived of the national government is a creation of the people, who have delegated some power to their state and local governments and some power to their national government, and, as a result, retain whatever powers they have not delegated.  Therefore, to the extent people have not already delegated power to any particular level of government, that power resides in the people.  Or maybe the phrase “or to the people” was added simply to make it clear that the 10th Amendment encompassed all rights — rights that the people could delegate to their government (i.e., rights involving the exercise of coercive authority) and rights that they really couldn’t because they are conceived of as residing in individuals (e.g., the rights to speak and worship).  Of course, the ambiguity could always be a matter of political expediency — perhaps the ratifiers couldn’t agree on what to put in the 10th Amendment and therefore comprised by including both the states and the people as the beneficiaries of reserved powers?

But — to me — the fact that the 10th Amendment mentions both the states and the people counts for something.

How much significance does this all have?  I’m not sure.  But it seems to me that the 10th Amendment’s ambiguity lends support Lincoln’s conception of the American Union (even pre-Civil War) and whatever consequences that may have.

A Brief Look Back at RNC 2012 and Ahead to the DNC

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Last week’s Republican National Convention has already been analyzed to death by people much smarter than me.

So, I won’t spend *much* time analyzing what happened other than to say that I think things went pretty well for Republicans in Tampa Bay and to offer some very brief analysis on the performance of the major players.

Looking Back at Tampa Bay

Mia Love:  Lots of loud red meat lines, delivered well after initial nervousness.

Ann Romney:  Likable, and one of the conventions top performers, but at times tried a bit too hard to appear in touch leading to some of the same awkwardness she was trying to counteract for her husband.

Chris Christie:  Disappointing, whether intentionally toned down out of respect for Romney or not.  Seems to be better on the stump w/close crowd interaction.

Artur Davis:  Most underreported speaker in Tampa Bay.  Can Republicans use him more?

Condi Rice:  Best speech of the convention.  And it’s no contest.  If things improve in the Middle East, she has a serious, national-level political future in front of her.  Maybe even if things don’t improve.

Susana Martinez:  Best job sharing a personal story of any of the speakers.  Definite political future, either continuing as governor, or national level as senator or cabinet member.  Don’t see her as a serious 2016 candidate, though.

Paul Ryan:  Hard hitting, stretched the facts as far as they will go.  Did his job well.  But fast (whether fairly or not) losing his reputation as a hard truth-teller.

Marco Rubio:  Pretty much as advertised.  Met, though didn’t exceed, expectations.  Still one of the shining stars in the Republican Party.

Mitt Romney:  Did a good job.  He didn’t come off as extreme.  His speech was good.  His wife and friends helped quite a bit.

And finally, a couple of themes.

GOP and Women/Hispanics:  TBD.  Clearly a major effort on the part of the GOP to recruit this group, though I’m not sure they’ve had great success yet.  I suspect they have opened some doors, or at least gotten some people to be willing to take a look at them going forward.  Much more work still to be done on this front.

Has Mitt been humanized?  I think so.  He’s now made it much more difficult for the Obama campaign to succeed in the extremist, heartless Mitt Romney campaign in which they are pretty heavily invested at this point.  But the image is going to have to be closely managed, because it can all be undone with a couple ill-timed gaffes.

Best line from the new nominee?  ”President Obama promised to begin to slow the rise of the oceans.   And to heal the planet.  My promise is to help you and your family.”

Now, to Charlotte!

With the Democrats upcoming convention, there is far less suspense.  No one’s asking about President Obama (as they did with Mitt Romney):  ”Will he give a good speech?”  ”Can he connect?”

We take it for granted that the speaking and connecting is the least of his troubles.  We don’t worry about it because we all know he’s really good.

But maybe we should.  Sure, President Obama has amazing rhetorical gifts.  He can connect with large audiences through speeches better than any President since Reagan.  And American people love rhetoric . . . for a while.  It can cover a multitude of sins . . . for a while.  It can inspire . . . for a while.  But ultimately, the American people are more doers than talkers, and eventually the soaring language has got to be backed up with something, or the disparity starts to become comical.

Which is why is everyone (OK, maybe 50-55 percent of everyone) was laughing last week about Mitt Romney’s making fun of President Obama’s “this is the moment when the oceans cease their rise” line from 2008 (Mitt’s finest moment, by the way).  It’s because the disconnect between the soaring rhetoric and difficult reality is so stark.

President Obama is a very smart guy.  He knows what I’m talking about.  And recently, he’s had to walk a very fine line between taking full advantage of his gift for speaking and managing it to match realities on the ground.

We won’t see the Obama of 2008 this time around.  We can’t.  The American people have heard all that and, by and large, aren’t too impressed with what it’s gotten them.

So, the President’s rhetoric has changed, despite the new campaign slogan (“Forward!”) designed to evoke subtle memories of “Hope and Change” and “Yes, we can.”  Now his gifts have to be employed in the rhetoric of opposition and fear — Mitt Romney is a heartless capitalist who has made a career of firing people, God bless him.  Republicans, our well-intentioned but benighted neighbors, want to drag America — specifically female America — back to 1954.  Republicans want to kill Medicare in order to make the rich more wealthy.

I suspect that President Obama’s talents won’t play as well in this context.  And this portrayal is going to be more difficult after last week in Tampa Bay.

He’ll want to pass this distasteful job off to surrogates.  But on the stage in Charlotte, he’s going to have to own the strategy, at least to an extent.

So, maybe there is something to wonder about in Charlotte after all.  I know I’ll be watching closely.

I wouldn’t underestimate President Obama.  But he’s got a much tougher task in front of him than many people want to admit.  So, tune in and see how he does.

How Mormons Make Money, or, Mormon, Inc., Part Deux

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Full disclosure: I’m a faithful (I think) and active Mormon.

Second update:  The LDS Church itself has already responded to the article here.

So an article from Bloomberg Businessweek titled, “How Mormons Make Money,” is a popular topic of commentary in Utah this week.  I started to put up some thoughts on Facebook, but my commentary quickly outstripped Facebook’s limited character requirements, so this got transferred to my political blog.  For those who think it might not fit well, trust me, this topic engenders every bit as much controversy as any political conversation.

Part of the so-called “Mormon Moment,” the article is the first major effort at exploring the finances of the LDS Church since Time Magazine ran an article titled “Mormon, Inc.,” back in the late 1990s.  The Businessweek effort is factually interesting, and I enjoyed reading it.  But I thought that, overall, the article has a slightly negative and suspicious tone to it, which, though it is, to an extent, understable, prompted me to comment on some of the themes that I saw.

Before I begin, you should realize that this commentary comes unapologetically from an insider’s perspective (also, note the standard disclaimer about this being my own view and not reflective of the official view or position of the LDS Church).

Theme 1:  The Mormon Church is a business disguised as a charitable nonprofit enterprise.

This is news to me and, I suspect, every other Mormon I know.  Despite all of the donated time and volunteer efforts, the LDS Church’s ecclesiastical organization extensive and expensive, taking a significant amount of resources . . . as in billions (I suspect) of dollars of resources . . . to run.  And like many nonprofits, the LDS Church supplements its donations with for-profit subsidiary businesses.  But one shouldn’t confuse the fact that the LDS Church runs for-profit business with the idea that it’s a business first, and a religious organization second.  The LDS Church’s financial excursions are driven by its mission, not the other way around.  Anyone who thinks that the LDS Church exists to serve LDS, Inc., needs to explain to me where all the Mormon billionaires are who are getting fat off the $8 billion in yearly tithing donations that flow into Salt Lake City from around the world — and why I’m not one of them. :)

I think it’s significant to note that the LDS Church isn’t the only nonprofit that makes an awful lot of money (FYI, I suspect that the LDS Church, despite being a tax exempt nonprofit, does pay quite a bit of taxes on unrelated business income, like other nonprofits with for-profit subsidiaries used to help finance operations).  While it’s legitimate to question whether churches, partisan educational associations, fraternal organizations, and other evangelical (in the secular sense of the word) organizations should be tax exempt, it’s best (in my opinion) to stay away from the type of subtle (or not so subtle) villainizing you sense in the Businessweek article, because I suspect that fact is that, these days, most nonprofits aren’t charitable organizations in the traditional, almsgiving sense.

Theme 2:  Mormons believe you can’t be faithful without being prosperous.

The Businessweek article quoted Keith B. McMullin, formerly of the LDS Church’s Presiding Bishopric, as saying “We look to not only the spiritual but also the temporal, and we believe that a person who is impoverished temporally cannot blossom spiritually.“  Does this mean that Mormon’s really believe that poverty hampers spiritual development?

I don’t believe this.  I’ve never been taught this.  I can say that I’m confident it’s not a part of Mormon theology.

But what is there in Mormon theology that would possess McMullin to reference a tie between temporal and spiritual development?

I think there are three ways in which Mormons associate temporal and spiritual development, and I’ve selected three quotes below that illustrate them.  Hopefully they’ll provide some insight on the matter:

Quote 1 (from 2 Nephi 5:13):

And we did observe to keep the judgments, and the statutes, and the commandments of the Lord in all things, according to the law of Moses.

And the Lord was with us; and we did prosper exceedingly; for we did sow seed, and we did reap again in abundance. And we began to raise flocks, and herds, and animals of every kind.

. . .

And it came to pass that we began to prosper exceedingly, and to multiply in the land.

Quote 2 (from Doctrine & Covenants Section 78):

For verily I say unto you, the time has come, and is now at hand; and behold, and lo, it must needs be that there be an organization of my people, in regulating and establishing the affairs of the storehouse for the poor of my people, both in this place and in the land of Zion —

For a permanent and everlasting establishment and order unto my church, to advance the cause, which ye have espoused, to the salvation of man, and to the glory of your Father who is in heaven;

That you may be equal in the bonds of heavenly things, yea, and earthly things also, for the obtaining of heavenly things.

For if ye are not equal in earthly things ye cannot be equal in obtaining heavenly things;

Quote 3 (from a recent address given by Bishop H. David Burton at the LDS Church’s semi-annual General Conference):

In 1897 a young David O. McKay stood at a door with a tract in his hand. As a missionary in Stirling, Scotland, he had done this many times before. But on that day a very haggard woman opened the door and stood before him. She was poorly dressed and had sunken cheeks and unkempt hair. She took the tract Elder McKay offered to her and spoke six words that he subsequently would never forget: “Will this buy me any bread?” This encounter left a lasting impression on the young missionary. He later wrote: “From that moment I had a deeper realization that the Church of Christ should be and is interested in the temporal salvation of man. I walked away from the door feeling that that [woman], with … bitterness in [her heart] toward man and God, [was] in no position to receive the message of the gospel. [She was] in need of temporal help, and there was no organization, so far as I could learn, in Stirling that could give it to [her].”

Mormons believe that God, while causing the rain to fall on all men and women alike, blesses those who strive to follow Him in both temporal and spiritual ways.  The theology of Mormonism also assigns spiritual importance to meeting temporal human needs — not only for the person who sacrifices to do so, but for the person whose needs are met.  Mormons see nothing inherently spiritual about impoverishment (in contrast to sacrifice, which tends to attune one’s soul to the needs of others) and believe that the reduction of temporal inequality tends to foster spiritual development by eliminating some of the conditions that contribute to spiritually-sabotaging feelings of jealously, contention, and discontentment.

Therefore, McMullin’s comment should be taken for what it is — an acknowledgment that there’s a connection between a person’s secular and spiritual life — and not as an assertion that rich people are more righteous, that a person’s wealth is an indicator of their spirituality, or that material prosperity is a precondition to salvation isn’t taught in the LDS Church.

Theme 3:  The LDS Church is overly secretive about its financial operations.

Every General Conference, the LDS Church leadership goes through an amusing ritual where they have a member of the Church’s auditing department give a 1 minute spiel about how the Church’s financial operations have been audited and found to be consistent with generally accepted accounting principles.  The Church also makes sure that it lets the members know, one way or the other, about its humanitarian operations throughout the world.  And once or twice a year, members are taught in Church about the importance of tithing and fast offerings, and how each type of donation made to the Church is generally used (e.g., tithing is for buildings and the administrative structure, fast offerings are for meeting physical needs, etc.).  But aside from that, members hear very little about the details of the Church’s financial operations.  There’s no question that the LDS Church does keep its financial condition quite close to the vest and the vast majority of members don’t have much of an idea at all of what the Church does financially, aside from running the day-to-day affairs of a worldwide ecclesiastical organization.

So . . . the LDS Church is secretive about its financial affairs — should this bother me?  I don’t think so.  And it doesn’t.  I find myself asking, “Is it overly secretive?,” and “What’s the alternative?”  What would happen if the LDS Church opened up the doors and showed everyone where each dollar of their tithing was spent?  Can you imagine the amount of second guessing?  Too many temples at too much cost, too expensive buildings, too much spent on air conditioning, the wrong models of cars . . . there would be no end to the matter.  Where money isn’t being exacted from people through political force, at the point of donation the money becomes the property of the donee, to be used in its discretion.

I think a lot of the angst over the secrecy is based on the assumption the Church is taking money from members of the pretense of charity and instead using it to run big businesses for purposes unrelated its religious mission.  And this brings us to the City Creek Center.  Should the Church really be taking $2 billion and spending it on a fancy real estate development project in a prosperous part of the world?  Certainly not . . . assuming the project is just about real estate and disconnected from the mission of the LDS Church (much as I like what City Creek will do for SLC).  But I don’t view City Creek as just a real estate development, any more than I view church ranches as nothing more than cattle operations.  Instead, I see it as the Church being creative when it comes to its mission, which is three-fold and accomplished or further through a variety of — both traditionally ecclesiastical (such as proselytizing) and non-traditionally ecclesiastical (see above) — means.  Based on this perspective, I don’t view the secrecy with respect to the LDS Church’s for-profit operations as something sinister.  Instead, I view it as a tactic to allow the Church to try and be effective and efficient with its mission . . . and maybe even make the occasional mistake without being publicly crucified.  I wouldn’t mind a bit more transparency, but I think calls for the doors to be thrown wide open and every expenditure to be publicly disclosed are unwarranted and probably counterproductive.

Closing Thoughts.

Let me offer a bit of perspective, for what it’s worth.  I think it’s important to keep in mind the roles history and theology might play in all of this.  Whether it’s now justified or not, there is still a strong sense of outside persecution within Mormonism, and I think quite a few of the LDS Church’s for-profit financial operations can be explained in part by a strong drive to be self-sufficient and independent, and to ensure, at least to the extent possible, that it is never again in the position where it so vulnerable as to be dependent upon the good graces of groups that may not wish it well.  It’s this desire for independence (and the ecclesiastical freedom/relative security that comes with it) that prompted the Mormon move to Utah and and creation of their own polity.  Once alone in Utah, Mormons created all kinds of farming, manufacturing, and retail enterprises and set up a strong hierarchical organization in order to be totally self-sufficient, and not be reliant on outside help or intervention.

Just as history may provide an explanation for the LDS Church’s affinity for business, the persistence of the Church’s for-profit operations may be partially due to theology.  Mormons believe that there will come a time, prior to the Second Coming of Christ, when the Church, in conjunction with its members will need financial independence.  I suspect the for-profit arm of the LDS Church is developed and sustained with that thought in mind as well.

Ultimate Conclusion.

The LDS Church is a charitable religious organization, not (primarily) Mormon, Inc.

Obamacare and Chief Justice Roberts

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Who is Chief Justice Roberts?

Is he the methodic, calculating, conservative revolutionary, that Obama had the foresight to oppose for confirmation to the Court based on his inability to discern what was in the now-Chief Justice’s heart?  Is he the pragmatic conservator of the Court’s institutional capital at the expense of the Court’s obligation to make authoritative constitutional pronouncements?  Or is he yet another conservative appointee driven ever left by mysterious unidentifiable substances in the Washington D.C. water supply?

And what to make of the Court’s decision today upholding Obamacare as a valid exercise of Congress’ taxing power?

Is it an unmitigated disaster that spells inevitable socialistic decline for America — assuming of course Mitt Romney and Orrin Hatch can’t team up on Democrats using the Senate Finance Committee and Oval Office? ;)  Is it a secret long-game win for conservatives masterminded by the Chief Justice at the expense of the unwitting liberals now praising his name?

So many questions to answer, so little time.

Rather than bore you with a treatise, I’ll just give you a few of my thoughts after reviewing the opinions (and trust me, this will be long enough).

1.  This decision is an unqualified loss for conservatives.  Though Roberts may have something of a long game in mind here (see point 4 below), it’s really hard to spin this as a win for conservatives.  Overall, the thrust of the opinion is, “you can find a way to uphold congressional action, even when it’s an unprecedented extension of federal power.”

To be fair, Roberts did throw conservatives some bones in his opinion. For example, it’s clear that he purposefully reached the Commerce Clause issue unnecessarily, in order to send a message about mandates.  His explanation to the contrary was unpersuasive (to me, anyway):

JUSTICE GINSBURG questions the necessity of rejecting the Government’s commerce power argument, given that § 5000A can be upheld under the taxing power. Post, at 37.  But the statute reads more naturally as a command to buy insurance than as a tax, and I would uphold it as a command if the Constitution allowed it. It is only because the Commerce Clause does not authorize such a command  that it is necessary to reach the taxing power question.  And it is only because we have a duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly possible, that § 5000A can be interpreted as a tax. Without deciding the Commerce Clause question, I would find no basis to adopt such a saving construction.

So it’s a tax only because it’s not a penalty?  Pretty weak . . . and that means he reached the issue to send a message.  Whatever his reasons for upholding, he obviously wanted to make clear that federal efforts to mandate conduct as a way of bootstrapping in to Commerce Clause authority are non-starters.

And one has to acknowledge that Roberts did refuse to countenance an extension of Congress’ spending/commandeering power.  Ultimately, however, it’s hard to see how that does much for federalist types when the practical thrust of his opinion is that even statutes that are written as exercises of the Commerce Clause authority, and exceed that authority, are nonetheless constitutional taxes (even when not denominated that way and denied publicly).  This allows Congress to avoid the political consequences of enacting taxes while pretty much giving Congress the type of unbridled legislative authority rejected under the Commerce Clause.

2.  Robert’s opinion will not make it procedurally easier to repeal Obamacare politically.  Today’s decision may very well have the effect of galvanizing conservatives for the upcoming elections (apparently it’s been a monetary windfall for Mitt), but those claiming (and I’ve seen a few posts on this today) that Justice Roberts judicially declared Obamacare a tax in order to ensure that, under the Democrats own congressional rules, efforts to repeal would be immune from filibuster (that captures the substance if not the precise form of the argument), clearly didn’t read Justice Roberts careful parsing of the difference between statutory and constitutional tax status:

Congress’s decision to label this exaction a “penalty” rather than a “tax” is significant because the Affordable Care Act describes many other exactions it creates as “taxes.”  Where Congress uses certain language in one part of a statute and different language in another, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally.

Amicus argues that even though Congress did not label the shared responsibility payment a tax, we should treat it as such under the Anti-Injunction Act because it functions like a tax. It is true that Congress cannot change whether an exaction is a tax or a penalty for constitutional purposes simply by describing it as one or the other. Congress may not, for example, expand its power under the Taxing Clause, or escape the Double Jeopardy Clause’s constraint on criminal sanctions, by labeling a severe financial punishment a “tax.”

The Anti-Injunction Act and the Affordable Care Act, however, are creatures of Congress’s own creation. How they relate to each other is up to Congress, and the best evidence of Congress’s intent is the statutory text. We have thus applied the Anti-Injunction Act to statutorily described “taxes” even where that label was inaccurate.

The desperate efforts of conservatives to label this decision a “win” for them remind me of Democrats attempts to rationalize President Obama caving to Republicans on the debt ceiling as grand liberal strategy.

3.  Roberts tax opinion is more persuasive than conservatives want to admit.  Although all the focus leading up to the case was on the Commerce Clause, Roberts’ opinion boils down to this:  constitutional authority to legislate depends on the substance of the legislation and not congressional magic words.  That’s a familiar principle, and persuasive in a number of contexts.  The effect of my contract depends on the written language and the intent of the contracting parties, not on the use of precise words to accomplish specific functions.

Should this be any different?  Well, we do have this sense that Congress should be allowed to use the tax designation as both a sword (justification for enacting authority) and a shield (insulation for political consequences of raising taxes).  But since when has Congress been estopped from legislating?  It’s also a bit surprising that Roberts went different ways on the Anti-Injunction Act and Taxing Power (see quote language above) . . . one felt that if the Court reached the merits of the case it would do so based on the finding that Obamacare was not a tax and therefore would be forced to decide the issue on Commerce Clause grounds alone.  But Roberts neatly worked around that dilemma by  holding that the individual mandate was indeed a tax, just not a tax to which Congress intended the Anti-Injunction Act would apply.

4.  Even though this is a loss for conservatives, there is something of a silver lining.  Between Roberts’ opinion and the Joint Dissent, there is a 5-member majority in support of unusually strong language on Commerce Clause federalism.  The language is so strong, in fact, that it likely forecloses any attempt at “compelled commerce” regulation in the near future.  This means that, if, down the line, conservatives are able to chip away at the rather deferential constitutional construction of a tax and/or expand on the Chief Justice’s anti-commandeering rationale, the field for Congressional action will have been limited.  It seems like Roberts’ opinion might also spawn some new Republican political strategy, like citing judicial authority to justify characterizing every regulation as a tax, or inserting punitive penalties into regulatory laws to sabotage them constitutionally . . . maybe I’m just reaching here, but no question congressional Republicans are committed and creative :)

5.  Roberts v. Scalia.  In case anyone doubted the sincerity of his commitment to judicial restraint (especially after Citizens United), Roberts’ opinion should allay that doubt (for now).  While Scalia’s commitment is, first and foremost, to originalist interpretation, Roberts’ jurisprudence is (in my opinion) guided to a significant extent by his beliefs about the role of the Court vis-a-vis the political branches and, to a lesser extent, preservation of its institutional capital.  I really think that this is the best way to look at his decision.  Which is the better approach?  I’ll leave that for you to decide . . . . ;)

6.  Another “switch in time”?  Although there is already a healthy ongoing debate over this, it does look (to me) as though Chief Justice Roberts changed his vote relatively late in the process.  It is hard for me to avoid the conclusion that the Joint Dissent (Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito) was written by Scalia as a majority opinion.  It contains numerous references to “the dissent,” despite itself being a dissent.  It is also written, like a majority opinion, using the plural “we,” as opposed to the singular “I.”  Here’s an example:

The dissent claims that we “fai[l] to explain why the individual mandate threatens our constitutional order.” Ante, at 35. But we have done so. It threatens that order because it gives such an expansive meaning to the Commerce Clause that all private conduct (including failure to act) becomes subject to federal control, effectively destroying the Constitution’s division of governmental powers. Thus the dissent, on the theories proposed for the validity of the Mandate, would alter the accepted constitutional relation between the individual and the National Government. The dissent protests that the Necessary and Proper Clause has been held to include “the power to enact criminal laws, . . . the power to imprison, . . . and the power to create a national bank.”  Is not the power to compel purchase of health insurance much lesser? No, not if (unlike those other dispositions) its application rests upon a theory that everything is within federal control simply because it exists.

Why were these references left in?  It could because of a last minute switch . . . but I doubt it.  Justice Roberts had to have time to write his opinion, and the Justices and clerks who write Supreme Court opinions are some of the very brightest people around — these edits could have been made no matter how late the change.  So, were they left in purposefully, as a signal to the world of a betrayal by the Chief Justice?  Well, I kind of doubt that as well . . . .  But whatever the explanation, it’s certainly interesting.

7.  Let’s get political!  Thus far in the battle over Obamacare, both sides have alternated being overly optimistic.  Prior to oral argument, quite a few Democrats were contemptuous of the merits of the legal challenge.  After oral argument, conservatives were prematurely dancing on Obamacare’s grave.  Liberals rejoicing today should take into account that it looks (if my sense if correct) like Obamacare was headed down to defeat and was saved only by a last minute defection (that was, in all likelihood, not wholly based on the merits of the case).  Furthermore, there is still a long way to go in the war over national health insurance in America, despite today’s decision.  And, while the Supreme Court will have more of a role to play, Roberts’ opinion, consistent with his commitment to circumscribing the judicial role, ensures that, going forward, this battle will be fought primarily politically from here on out.

Anyway, I’d love to hear your thoughts, whether on the opinion or my own commentary.  Type away — I can take it :)

H.B. 351, Opt-Out of Order on White House Rural Council — Rep. Ivory

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After a long, work-induced hiatus from blogging, Utah Political Summary returns today with some brief commentary on H.B. 351, a bill sponsored by Representative Ken Ivory.

H.B. 351 is part of our legislature’s ongoing effort to step federal government meddling in local government by preemptive state meddling in local government.  Specifically, it’s a response to Executive Order 13575 (“EO13575″), which was issued by President Obama last June and creates a White House Rural Council (“WHRC”) to “enhance Federal engagement with rural communities.”

EO13575

The WHRC would be chaired by a representative of the Department of Agriculture, comprised of a representative of every other federal department, and tasked with the mission of “coordinat[ing] development of policy recommendations to promote economic prosperity and quality of life in rural America,” and “coordinate[ing] [the Obama] Administration’s engagement with rural communities.”

Specifically, the WHRC will:

  • Make recommendations to President Obama on how to streamline and leverage the impact of federal investment dollars in rural communities;
  • Coordinate and increase the effectiveness of federal engagement with rural America’s stakeholders; and
  • Identify and facilitate rural energy development, outdoor recreation and conservation-related opportunities.

On its face, EO13575 appears to be nothing more than an attempt to coordinate efforts across departments, to make the administration’s “rural policy” more cohesive and effective.

But it’s got Representative Ivory up in arms.  In fact, he refers to it on his Facebook page as an order creating “White House zoning and planning authority over all ‘rural America.’”  So he’s crafted H.B. 351 — a legislative response consistent with his apparent alarm.

H.B. 351

Representative Ivory’s bill, which was passed out of committee on February 27, 2012, would require any “department or agency of the state” that wants to implement a “directive” of the White House Rural Council created by EO13575, to file a report to the legislature’s Natural Resources, Agriculture, and Environment Interim Committee containing the following information:

(3) (a) The report required under Subsection (1)(a) shall include:

(i) the directive from the White House Rural Council; and

(ii) a description of:

(A) the requirements imposed by the directive and how the agency would implement the directive;

(B) the effect of implementing or not implementing the directive;

(C) the cost to the state or its citizens of implementing the directive; and

(D) the consequences to the state if the state does not comply with the directive.

(b) The report required under Subsection (1) may include an analysis by the agency or department that addresses whether a directive from the White House Rural Council:

(i) affects the distribution of power and responsibility among the state and national government;

(ii) limits the policymaking discretion of the state;

(iii) impacts a power or a right reserved to the state or its citizens by the Ninth or Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; or

(iv) impacts the sovereignty rights and interest of the state or a political subdivision to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of, and to promote the prosperity of, the state’s or the political subdivision’s citizens.

The required report is designed to give the legislature an opportunity to legislate in opposition to the “directive,” if it so chooses.  In fact, after receiving the report from the “department or agency of the state,” the Natural Resources, Agriculture, and Environment Interim Committee can recommend to the legislature that it enact legislation that either specifically authorizes or prohibits compliance with the “directive.”

The supreme irony in the whole situation?  Representative Ivory’s bill would be codified  at Utah Code Ann. 63M-1-1607 et seq., as part of Utah’s already existing Rural Development Program, which is operated out of the Governor’s Office of Economic Development through the Office of Rural Development, which in conjunction with the Rural Coordinating Committee, provides support to the Governor’s Rural Partnership Board.

And the mission of the state’s Rural Development Program?  Here’s a bulleted list:

  • Facilitate within the Governor’s Office of Economic Development implementation of the strategic plan;
  • Work to enhance the capacity of the Governor’s Office of Economic Development to address rural economic development, planning, and leadership training challenges and opportunities by establishing partnerships and positive working relationships with appropriate public and private sector entities, individuals, and institutions;
  • Work with the Rural Coordinating Committee to coordinate and focus available resources in ways that address the economic development, planning, and leadership training challenges and priorities in rural Utah; and
  • Coordinate relations between the state, rural governments, public/private groups engaged in rural economic planning and development, and federal agencies.

Some Thoughts

I think it’s pretty clear that Representative Ivory sees the White House Rural Council as another front on the war over western state lands.  Perhaps it is.  I don’t know.  But there’s nothing in EO13575 or the duties set out for the WHRC authorizing it to make “directives” to local governments, and certainly nothing in it that authorizes it to engage in nationwide zoning.

President Obama, like other Presidents before him, undoubtedly has a “plan” for rural America, and will go about implementing his “plan” in whatever way he can, including, presumably, by conditioning the receipt of federal funds on local governments implementing plan objectives.  But it’s questionable whether such “incentives” can fairly be characterized as “directives.”  Thus, to have any effect, it appears that Representative Ivory’s bill would require all “departments or agencies of the state,” any time they want to implement a suggestion or recommendation originating from the WHRC, to first create a burdensome report for the state legislature.  This is turf-war level of micromanagement that would do the most overreaching federal agency proud.

Now, Representative Ivory may believe that the Constitution grants the state exclusive authority to make recommendations to local governments and rural America.  After all, Article II of the Constitution is pretty sparse . . . .  But at some point, he, and the other members of the Utah GOP’s club of constitutional crusaders need to contemplate the extent to which their near myopic obsession over their own version of constitutional federalism is turning them is seriously undermining their core conservative governing principles.

If President Obama issues an order emanating from the WHRC that unconstitutionally dictates to rural Utahns what they may or may not do, then legislate against it or fight it in court as appropriate.  But why borrow trouble and micromanage just out of antipathy toward one particular administration?  President Obama will eventually leave office, the WHRC he created will be dissolved, and a Republican will be elected President again . . . but legislation persists.  H.B. 351 is unnecessary, misguided, and not worth our legislature’s time.

Open Political Caucuses – Comparing the Powell and Romero Bills

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The fallout of H.B. 477 continues up at the Utah legislature, with two bills this session — one from each side of the aisle — that would require parties to make their caucuses open to the public in certain circumstances.

One bill, H.B. 89, is proposed by Representative Kraig Powell, who promised to make this a focus of his efforts after publicly back-tracking in his original support of H.B. 477.  The other bill, S.B. 45, is being sponsored by Democratic Senator Ross Romero, currently a candidate for Salt Lake County Mayor.

I thought I’d take a couple minutes and compare the two bills, to see what the differences are.

H.B. 89 – Representative Powell

H.B. 89 is by far the simpler bill, providing simply that wherever a quorum of a “public body” is present at a meeting of a “political party, political group, or political caucus” where “legislative action” is being discussed, that meeting must be open to the public, though attendance can be regulated.

Here’s the actual text:

52-4-211.  Political caucus open to public — Conditions.

(1) A political party, political group, or political caucus is not subject to the provisions of this chapter except as provided in Subsection (2).

(2)(a) If a quorum of a public body is present at an assembly of a political party, political group, or political caucus, any discussion by the political party, political group, or political caucus of legislative action by the public body, whether the legislative action is pending, proposed, potential, or previously-passed, is open to the public.

(b) A political party, political group, or political caucus may regulate or limit attendance at a discussion described in Subsection (2)(a) if reasonable access to the discussion by the public is preserved.

A “public body” is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-103 as follows:

   (8) (a) “Public body” means any administrative, advisory, executive, or legislative body of the state or its political subdivisions that:
(i) is created by the Utah Constitution, statute, rule, ordinance, or resolution;
(ii) consists of two or more persons;
(iii) expends, disburses, or is supported in whole or in part by tax revenue; and
(iv) is vested with the authority to make decisions regarding the public’s business.

(b) “Public body” does not include a:
(i) political party, political group, or political caucus; or
(ii) conference committee, rules committee, or sifting committee of the Legislature.

A “quorum” is defined as “a simple majority of the membership of a public body,” though it “does not include a meeting of two elected officials by themselves when no action, either formal or informal, is taken on a subject over which these elected officials have advisory power.”

None of the other key terms in H.B. 89 are defined, but they are more self-explanatory.  The practical effect of the bill would seem to be almost exclusively limited to state legislative party caucuses because, although a non-partisan legislative body like a city council might qualify as a “public body,” in order to be subject to the provisions of this chapter, a majority of the members of the city council would have to assemble at a meeting of a political party, political group, or political caucus, where a legislative action (past, current, or future) was being discussed.  This seems unlikely, although it’s possible to imagine a scenario where, say, a (quorum) a simple majority of Salt Lake City council members decide to attend a Democratic or Republican Party meeting where the legislation efforts of the council would be discussed — if that happened, it seems that H.B. 89 would require that meeting to be open to the public.

S.B. 45 – Senator Ross Romero

Senator Romero’s bill is much more detailed that Representative Powell’s and reads as follows:

52-4-211. Meetings of legislative political caucuses.

(1) As used in this section:

(a) “Legislative party leadership” means:

(i) the speaker of the House of Representatives;
(ii) the president of the Senate;
(iii) the leader, whip, assistant whip, or manager of a legislative political caucus; or
(iv) the chair or vice chair of the Executive Appropriations Committee, the Senate Rules Committee, or the House Rules Committee.

(b) (i) “Legislative political caucus” means an assembly of legislators:

(A) to which belong a majority of legislators from the same registered political party in a chamber of the Legislature;
(B) called to assemble by a person authorized by the caucus to do so for the purpose of discussing policy, legislation, strategy, plans, or registered political party business; and
(C) on a day that the Legislature is conducting the annual general session, a veto-override session, or a special session.

(ii) “Legislative political caucus” does not mean:

(A) an assembly of legislators who are an informal or unofficial subgroup of a registered political party;
(B) an assembly of legislators who meet because the legislators share a particular political philosophy distinguishable from the legislative political caucus; or
(C) a meeting only attended by two or more legislative party leadership.

(c) “Registered political party” is as defined in Section 20A-8-101 .

(2) (a) A legislative political caucus is not required to comply with the provisions of this chapter except as provided in this section.

(b) A legislative political caucus shall be open to the public except in the circumstances described in Subsection (3).

(3) A legislative political caucus is not required to be open to the public during the portion of the caucus during which business is conducted relating to:

(a) a purpose described in Subsection 52-4-205 (1); or
(b) caucus or legislative party leadership elections.

Senator Romero’s bill would seem to open all official party legislative caucuses to the public that (1) are called by party leadership, (2) during the legislative session, (3) for the purpose of discussing legislation, plans, or strategy.  In that sense it is broader than H.B. 89, which would apply only to caucuses where a (1) a quorum was present, and (2) were held for discussions of legislative action.  As currently drafted, S.B. 45 would also be more narrow that H.B. 89 in that it would only apply to assemblies of “legislators” and would only operate when the legislature is in session.

However, all these distinctions may be more apparent than real, as it is unlikely that Representative Powell’s bill would have much (if any) application outside of the the legislative session, and Senator Romero’s bill contains a number of exceptions designed to allow the caucuses to be closed in specific situations (such as party leadership elections and the other many situations identified in Utah Code Ann. 52-4-205(1)) and to exempt specific groups, such as the Patrick Henry Caucus, for example, from the open caucus requirement.

Overall, the bills are similar enough in their effect, that’s it’s probably a wash between the two.  The more interesting fight will take place between those who will argue that it’s an impermissible limitation on the freedom of association to mandate closed caucuses at all.  I’ll be posting on that a bit later, if I can find the time.

 

H.B. 253 — Voter Registration Amendments, Rep. Powell

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Remember Representative Kraig Powell?

He made headlines last spring for his very public and deeply emotional change of position on H.B. 477 and his commitment to work for transparency in the future.  This year — at least according to the Utah legislature’s website — he’s poised to make good on that promise, having opened up a number of bill files dealing with legislative transparency:

But at least one of his initial efforts in this young legislative session deserves some more scrutiny.  H.B. 253, which Rep. Powell introduced in committee yesterday, would require county clerks to remove the names of voters from the county’s registration rolls in each of the following circumstances:

  1. The voter dies and his or her name is listed on the annual report of deceased residents from the Department of Health’s Bureau of Vital Records;
  2. A voter sends written confirmation to the county clerk that he or she no longer resides in the county;
  3. The voter requests, in writing, that the county clerk remove his or her name from the county’s registration rolls;
  4. The county clerk receives a notice that the voter has registered to vote in another state;
  5. The county clerk receives a notice that the voter has been convicted of (1) a felony in any state or federal court, or (2) an election-related misdemeanor (e.g., fraudulent voter registration) and determines that the voter’s right to vote has not been restored by applicable law; and
  6. After a voter has failed to respond to a written notice from the county clerk (sent to the address on his or her registration records), the voter fails to vote in the next 2 general elections.

Current law allows, but does not require, a county clerk to remove a voter’s name from the registration rolls for any of the first five reasons.  H.B. 253 would make it mandatory, which is in itself a significant change.  But the real meat of H.B. 253 is in the addition of the sixth basis for name removal.  And it seems poised to send a lot of flak Rep. Powell’s way.

Here’s how the sixth basis would operate.  H.B. 253 would require county clerks to send a notice to each person who fails to vote in two consecutive general elections, which are held once every two years.  So, for example, if I failed to vote in 2010 and 2012, the Davis County clerk’s office would be required, by law, to send me a notice informing me that my registration will be revoked if I do not respond to the notice or actually vote in one of the next two general elections.  Then, if I both (1) failed to respond to the notice, and (2) failed to vote in either of the subsequent two general elections (2014 and 2016), my registration would be automatically revoked.

Shortly after the legislative session closed yesterday, an article appeared in the Salt Lake Tribune in which an attorney for the ACLU was quoted as suggesting that H.B. 253 was illegal because it ran contrary to controlling federal law. Defenders of the bill responded, arguing that, not only is H.B. 253 consistent with federal law, but it was a good idea because: (1) the threat of being removed from the voter registration rolls will make people more likely to vote; (2) it makes voter fraud more difficult by removing the excess names from the state’s voter registration rolls; and (3) it will make Utah’s voting statistics more accurate, thus presumably making us look better to outsiders.

I wanted to take a couple minutes to respond to each of the arguments noted above and to offer a few of my own thoughts.

Federal Law

Although the Tribune’s article cites an attorney for the ACLU contending that H.B. 253 would violate the “National Voting Rights Act,” I believe she was actually referring to the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (the “NVRA,” aka the “motor voter bill”).  While there is a “Voting Rights Act,” I don’t believe there is a “National Voting Rights Act” —  it all seems like understandable acronym confusion.

Contrary to the assertion of the ACLU’s attorney, my research suggests that applicable federal law (i.e., the NVRA) specifically allows for the removal of voters from the state’s registration rolls as contemplated by H.B. 253 (though I acknowledge my lack of expertise and the fact that it’s entirely possible I could be proven wrong).  Here’s the applicable section from the NVRA, codified at 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-6:

(b) Confirmation of voter registration

Any state program or activity to protect the integrity of the electoral process by ensuring the maintenance of an accurate and current voter registration roll for elections for Federal office -

(1) shall by uniform, nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 1973 et seq.); and

(2) shall not result in the removal of the name of any person from the official list of voter registered to vote in an election for Federal office by reason of the person’s failure to vote, except that nothing in this paragraph may be construed to a State from using the procedures described in subsections (c) and (d) to remove an individual from the official list of eligible voters if the individual -

(A) has not either notified the applicable registrar (in person or in writing) or responded during the period described in subparagraph (b) to the notice sent by the applicable registrar; and then

(B) has not voter or appeared to vote in 2 or more consecutive general elections for Federal office.

Based on this language, it appears to me that if H.B. 253 is nondiscriminatory (i.e. generally applicable), it is consistent with federal law.

Justifications — Encouragement, Fraud, and Our Image, Elevated

Rep. Powell suggested yesterday in committee that receipt of a notice threatening to revoke registration would actually prompt more people to vote.  Although it’s an interesting argument, he offered no evidence in support of his contention.  Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, that his assertion is true, it strikes me that someone just voting once everyone 4 – 8 years to preserve their registration isn’t really the type of participation that we want to encourage.  And the idea that our elected officials believe that a legitimate way of getting people to vote is threatening to revoke their registration is, frankly, a bit concerning.

Representative Powell also contended that removing non-voters would make it more difficult for people to commit voter fraud.  This is certainly the case for people who have died  (who can already be removed under the current version of Utah’s law), but it’s hard to see how simply sending a notice to habitual non-voters would accomplish this objective.

Finally, the most ridiculous justification from Rep. Powell for H.B. 253 was that leaving the names of non-voters on the state’s rolls makes us look bad because it makes our percentage voting statistics seem lower than they actually are.  This may be true, but it’s ridiculous to suggest that burnishing our public image in this respect is worth the very real possibility that some of Utah’s previously unengaged voters will attempt to vote on election day only to find that their name has been removed from the voter registration rolls because they had not previously been civically engaged.  Furthermore, it seems that H.B. 253 would have just as much, if not more, potential for distorting Utah’s voting statistics.  How in the world do we get an accurate picture of Utah’s level of civic engagement by ignoring people who are eligible to vote but are, for whatever reason, not exercising the franchise?  The whole thing smacks of ostrich-style willful ignorance.  Regardless of whether eligible voters choose to participate in elections or not, they remain a part of the body politic.  As was noted by numerous others yesterday afternoon:  The right to vote includes the right not to vote.

One of the primary arguments of those critical with Utah’s caucus system is that it contributes to Utah’s alarmingly low levels of electoral participation.  There’s a part of me that wonders whether this bill is designed, at least in part, as an attempt to answer that critique by artificially inflating voter participation totals overnight, coincident with the GOP’s laudable push to get as many people out to caucus night as possible.

Some Closing Thoughts

It makes sense to occasionally review our voter registration rolls to ensure that they are accurate and up to date.  So let’s ensure that people who are clearly disqualified from voting in Utah are removed to discourage fraud and help us get an accurate idea of Utah’s level of civic engagement.  But it doesn’t do Utah or its voters any good to take away someone’s voter registration simply based on the fact that they haven’t voted.

 

Montana Supreme Court Thumbs its Nose at Citizens United, Upholds Montana Law Prohibiting Corporate Contributions

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In a bolt from the blue last Friday, the Montana Supreme Court issued its decision in Western Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Attorney General, pushing back against the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Citizen United v. Federal Election Comm’n.  In Western Tradition Partnership, the court interpreted Citizens United to allow for Montana’s prohibition on corporate contributions for candidates because of Montana’s unique history and susceptibility to corruption from corporate money.

It’s a decision bound to generate a lot of buzz and have a lot of populist appeal.  It’s also a ruling that runs completely contrary to the understandings of everyone — except, apparently, five of the seven members of the Montana Supreme Court — about what Citizens United meant and what it did.  I’m sure it would shock Justice Stevens to know his concerns about the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Citizens United were vastly overstated; after all, why all the worry when states can simply opt out by judicial decision??!!

Immediately upon learning about the ruling, I went and downloaded the full copy and started reading.

Despite headlines to the contrary (e.g., “Montana Supreme Court Rules that Citizens United Does Not Apply in Montana“), the Montana Supreme Court’s decision was actually based on its own interpretation and application of the rule of law set down in Citizens United.  State supreme courts, as well as other inferior federal courts, do this kind of thing all the time.  Whenever the United States Supreme Court sets down a rule, it does so in the context of a specific case.  So, courts looking to apply that rule to another case, with a different set of facts, have to determine if there are factual distinctions that would justify a different result, even given the application of the same rule.

The Montana Supreme Court’s reasoning goes something like this (for a more pithy version, check out Marco Brown’s comment here):  In Citizens United, the United States Supreme Court determined that the challenged FEC rules should be struck down because there was not a sufficiently compelling interest supporting them.  But in Montana — a rural state with a small population, proud history of cheap, grassroots campaigning, susceptibility to large energy and mineral extraction corporations, and a long history of corruption — there is a greater interest that is sufficiently compelling to uphold a ban on corporate contributions.  In addition, Montana elects its judges, and the potential for corporate domination of judicial elections is another factor that enhances Montana’s interest vis-a-vis the ones considered and rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Citizens United.

Its an approach to the question that’s theoretically legitimate.  Indeed, if one believes that strict scrutiny should not be “strict in theory, but fatal in fact,” there should be some set of facts creating an interest sufficiently compelling that could be served by a narrowly tailored statute — right?

The trouble with the Montana Supreme Court’s approach is that it’s an approach that the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected last year, at least in the context of corporate political speech.  From the majority opinion in Citizens United:

We return to the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations (emphasis added).

Despite this unequivocal and unusually clear statement, the Montana Supreme Court persisted in its contention, that the United States Supreme Court wasn’t really talking about government in small-population mineral-rich rural states like Montana.

Western Tradition Partnership will (and should) be quickly reversed on certiorari appeal for the reasons set out by the primary dissenting Justice, James C. Nelson:

Unquestionably, Montana has its own unique history. No doubt Montana also has compelling interests in preserving the integrity of its electoral process and in encouraging the full participation of its electorate. And Montana may indeed be more vulnerable than other states to corporate domination of the political process. But the notion argued by the Attorney General and adopted by the Court—that these characteristics entitle Montana to a special “no peeing” zone in the First Amendment swimming pool—is simply untenable under Citizens United.

Admittedly, I have never had to write a more frustrating dissent. I agree, at least in principle, with much of the Court’s discussion and with the arguments of the Attorney General. More to the point, I thoroughly disagree with the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United. I agree, rather, with the eloquent and, in my view, better-reasoned dissent of Justice Stevens. As a result, I find myself in the distasteful position of having to defend the applicability of a controlling precedent with which I profoundly disagree.

That said, this case is ultimately not about my agreement or disagreement with the Attorney General or our satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the Citizens United decision.  Whether we agree with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment is irrelevant. In accordance with our federal system of government, our obligations here are to acknowledge that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the United States Constitution is, for better or for worse, binding on this Court and on the officers of this state, and to apply the law faithful to the Supreme Court’s ruling.

Granted, there are some in the legislative and executive branches of government who would call—and, in fact, have called—for Montana to thumb its nose at the federal government, to disregard federal law, and to boldly ignore the Supremacy Clause. Regardless of those views, however, all elected officials in Montana—legislative, executive, and judicial—are sworn to “support, protect and defend the constitution of the United States.”  Obviously, this means in accordance with the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the United States Constitution. Thus, when the highest court in the country has spoken clearly on a matter of federal constitutional law, as it did in Citizens United, the highest court in Montana—this Court—is not at liberty to disregard or parse that decision in order to uphold a state law that, while politically popular, is clearly at odds with the Supreme Court’s decision. This is the rule of law and is part and parcel of every judge’s and justice’s oath of office to “support, protect and defend the constitution of the United States.” In my view, this Court’s decision today fails to do so.

There are, unquestionably, discomforting realities that accompany unlimited corporate political speech.  One can easily understand the frustrations of the majority Justices, feeling as though their state’s political process is being dragged back to 1900 by a panel of conservative United States Supreme Court Justices that simply don’t understand the opportunities for distortion in the political process that accompany unfettered corporate speech in a sparsely populated rural state.

And maybe they’re right.  But that doesn’t give them license to ignore the Constitution when the Supreme Court has spoken clearly on the matter.  Perhaps the greatest irony of the majority opinion is the fact that it forcefully expresses concern for the potential distorting and corrupting effects that corporate speech might have on the Montana’s elected judiciary.  Based on this opinion, it seems as though an elected judiciary’s understandable, though misguided, efforts to avoid Citizens United may themselves be causing the same kind of distortion.

What Should Be Done About Utah’s Unenforceable Campaign Session Contribution Law?

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By now it seems that everyone pretty much acknowledges that Utah’s law prohibiting candidates from soliciting campaign contributions during the legislative session is unenforceable as to candidates for federal office.  In addition, as I pointed out this past November, it may also be unconstitutional with respect to other candidates.

But the law can be fixed, and the fixes are not that difficult.

For example, rewriting the law like this (just want to make sure you’re clear this is a proposed rewrite) would clearly make its prohibitions (at least the ones that remain) enforceable:

36-11-305. Campaign contribution during session prohibited.

1. It is unlawful for a person, lobbyist, principal, or political committee to make a campaign contribution or contract, promise, or agree to make a campaign contribution to a legislator or a legislator’s personal campaign committee, or a political action committee controlled by a legislator during the time the Legislature is convened in annual general session, veto override session, or special session.

2. It is unlawful for a person, lobbyist, principal, or political committee to make a campaign contribution, or contract, promise, or agree to make a campaign contribution, to the governor, the governor’s personal campaign committee, or a political action committee controlled by the governor during the time the Legislature is convened in annual general session, veto override session, special session, or during the time period established by the Utah Constitution, Article VII, Section 8, for the governor to approve or veto bills passed by the Legislature in the annual general session.

3. The prohibitions contained in this section shall not apply to a contribution, contract, promise, or agreement to make a campaign contribution to an announced candidate, or to such candidate’s person campaign committee or a political action committee controlled by such a candidate, for United States Congress.

4. The prohibitions contained in this section shall not be construed to prohibit an announced candidate from making a direct personal contribution to that candidate’s personal campaign committee.

3. 5. Any person who violates this section is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

There it is representatives/senators, H.B./S.B. ____.  The proposed revisions above are just a reflexive first crack at fixing the law, but they address the problems of federal preemption as well as potential constitutional concerns resulting from the extension of the prohibitions to all people, as opposed to only lobbyists.

It would leave the law enforceable as to legislators and the governor, if running for re-election or another municipal, county, and state offices, when it comes to contributions from lobbyists and political committees, but would allow citizens and candidates to make contributions to candidates during the legislative session.  It’s primary effect would be to eliminate contributions from lobbyists made during the session, which was the primary focus of the law as originally enacted.  Contributions to candidates for federal office would be regulated by federal law.  If our legislators don’t like the fragmented nature of the law as it remains, they should repeal it.

Regardless of the final language that’s used, the fix is straightforward and should be made.  But certainly no current candidate is going to bring a legal challenge to the law, thereby giving his opponent an issue to use against him in the upcoming campaign.  And I worry that our state legislators (and perhaps the governor himself) likewise lack the political will to do anything about Utah’s session contribution law because they’re worried it might be bad for their political careers to become known as the person who loosened restrictions on politicians being able to solicit money during the legislative session.

Indeed, it appears that everyone may be content just to leave the law on the books as another unenforceable statement — a statement that is, though without the actual force of law, nonetheless potent because no one wants to risk their careers by being the one to cross it.  Or, maybe because some wish the law were enforceable and are content to let it operate as though it were.   Both sides rationalize their positions by saying, “Hey, enforceable or not, it’s a good practice.  Why not just leave things as they are?”

But regardless of whether people shouldn’t be taking campaign contributions during the legislative session, this isn’t the way we should be legislating (or, not legislating, in this case).

Someone needs to step up and fix this law, or get rid of it altogether.

 

Utah Supreme Court — “Minor Child” Includes Unborn for Purposes of Wrongful Death Statute

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Yesterday, the Utah Supreme Court made news when, in a 4-1 decision in the case of Carranza v. United States, it ruled that Utah’s wrongful death statute allowed parents to bring a wrongful death claim on behalf of an unborn child.

Although the Court reached its result 4-1, with only Justice Nehring dissenting, the decision spawned three separate opinions — the “majority” opinion by Chief Justice Durham, joined by Justice Parrish; a concurring opinion by Justice Lee, joined by Justice Durrant; and Justice Nehring’s dissent.  The opinions couldn’t be more different in the way they approach a difficult question of statutory interpretation.

Before I jump into some brief summaries of the various opinions (followed by a few of my own thoughts), a caveat about the impact of the Court’s decision:

It’s important to note right up front that, in its decision, the Court was interpreting a version of Utah’s minor wrongful death/injury statute that is no longer in effect.  In 2009, the Utah legislature amended the statute so that it only grants parents a cause of action for injury to minor children; not for wrongful death.  Thus, despite the Court’s ruling, parents cannot sue for wrongful death of their unborn children because Utah no longer has a statutory cause of action.  The court’s ruling does seem to mean, however, that parents can sue for prenatal injury to an unborn child that survives birth.  

For Non-Legal Types: A Primer on Statutory Interpretation

Statutory interpretation is all about intent.  When it interprets a statute, a court’s goal is to find out what the legislature intended to accomplish when it passed a law and to interpret the law in a way that gives effect to that intent.

But the court has a very specific rules about how it can discern legislative intent.  First, the court is going to look at the language of the statute itself. If the court decides the language is clear, it won’t look at anything else, and will make it’s interpretation based on the plain meaning of the statutory language.  This is a judge developed approach that accomplishes a couple things.  First, it holds the legislature’s feet to the fire a little bit, making clear that the courts are not going to bail them out and reinterpret laws contrary to the way they are written.  It encourages legislators to draft laws using words that clearly communicate how they want the law to be applied. It also (theoretically, anyway) makes it more likely that a legislature will enact laws that can be read and understood by the citizens against whom they will be applied.

While assessing legislative intent from the statutory language is the goal, language that has a plain meaning under most circumstances can become ambiguous in certain situations. When a court, in a specific situation, can’t clearly discern how the legislature intended a law to apply based on the text of the law alone, it will look to other sources to determine legislative intent. In particular, courts will look to legislative debates and committee reports, context within the statute and other statutes, and whether the statute was enacted in response to a specific event, among others.

But it’s important to remember that even thought the court looks to other sources, the question is still the same:  What did the legislature intend to accomplish when enacting this law?  Thus, the one thing a court must not do — even when a statute is drafted so ambiguously that legislative intent may be fairly described as “clear as mud” — is interpret the statute in accordance with the preferences of the judges as to what the law should be.  Respect for the separation of powers requires that a court make its best efforts to interpret the law in accordance with the legislature’s intent.

Of course, in the event the court gets it wrong, the legislature can always overrule them by passing another law. But that’s neither here nor there.

With that out of the way, on to the opinions.

Chief Justice Durham 

Chief Justice Durham’s opinion is the most surprising of the three, and not in a good way.

The case hinged on whether the use of the term “minor child” in the wrongful death statute referred only to minor children who survived birth, or to minor children, whether born or unborn.

The Chief Justice, seemingly unwilling to acknowledge the ambiguities in the term “minor child,” tosses aside competing interpretations with a matter-of-fact assertion — supported exclusively by a dictionary definition and cases from other states — that the term “child” is usually used to refer to both born and unborn children.  The Chief Justice then reasoned that the addition of the word “minor”  in front of child was meant to set an upper limit on the parental cause of action (i.e., parents lose the right to sue on their child’s behalf when their child reaches the age of majority)  and didn’t speak to the question of whether the term “child” encompassed the unborn as well as born children.

In support of her conclusions the Chief Justice also quoted language from Utah’s judicial statutes emphasizing that the “public policy” of Utah is to protect the rights of all persons, including “unborn persons” (note the inclusion of the modifier “unborn” in this instance), and the following reasoning from an Ohio court:

Suppose, for example, viable unborn twins suffered simultaneously the same prenatal injury of which one died before and the other after birth.  Shall there be a cause of action for the death of the one and not for that of the other? Surely logic requires recognition of causes of action for the deaths of both, or for neither.

While the Chief Justice’s logic may be persuasive as a matter of policy, it doesn’t tell us much of anything about legislative intent.  It’s entirely possible that the Utah legislature intended the interpretation of the law articulated by Chief Justice Durham, but dictionaries and citations to other jurisdictions don’t tell us whether they did or whether they didn’t.  And therein lies the problem.

Justice Lee

While Justice Lee reached the same result as Chief Justice Durham, his legal analysis was, in my opinion, much more robust — though not without its issues.  Acknowledging the ambiguities in the term “minor child,” Justice Lee eschewed any reliance on the statute’s “plain language.”  To him, the language was anything but plain, and he pointed out the reasons he though Justice Durham’s plain language analysis was wrong:

Where both parties’ interpretations fall within the range of meanings identified in dictionaries, it is unhelpful for the court to rest on the unelaborated assertion that our chosen construction is dictated by the “plain language.” Too often, a court’s conclusion that statutory language is “plain” is a substitute for careful analysis. At best, such unexplained conclusions are based on a judge’s gestalt sense of the best meaning of the words in question. At worst, the bare insistence that statutory language is “plain” is cover (perhaps subconscious) for judicial policymaking.

Any appearance of the latter is unacceptable. And the former is insufficient, as it gives no guidance to the drafters or targets of legislation as to how this court will interpret statutory language (beyond the unhelpful assurance that we will do what seems best and label it “plain language”). In my view, then, we need to identify the linguistic and statutory cues that persuade us that one interpretation or the other is appropriate.

Failing to find a clear indication of legislative intent in the statute’s plain language, Justice Lee looked elsewhere to determine what the legislature intended with respect to unborn children when it used to the term “minor child.”

Justice Lee took as his starting point what he described as a “universal” and “undisputed” rule that “prenatal injuries are actionable when a child survives” a tortious act (i.e., injury) inflicted in utero (It is notable that, while Justice Lee cites to numerous decisions from other jurisdictions in support of his claim, he does not cite to any Utah cases adopting the universal rule).  From the premise of the rule that parents can sue, on behalf of their surviving children, for prenatal injuries, Justice Lee concludes that it would be anomalous to think that the legislature intended that parents of children who died from the same prenatal injuries lacked any remedy at law:

[G]iven that minor children have tort claims when they survive a tortious act in utero, it would be absurd to read the statute to foreclose such claim when the fetus is so battered that he dies in the womb. If a “minor child” includes a fetus who suffers tortious injury, surely that same term encompasses the same kind of being that suffers an even more horrific tortious act.

A contrary view would yield perverse incentives that the wrongful death statute cannot reasonably be read to countenance.  If “minor child” did not extend to a fetus, tortfeasors would be better off killing a fetus in the womb (in which case they would escape liability) than to merely injure it (in which case they would be liable for the injuries or post-birth death of a fetus if it happens to be born alive, however fleeting its sojourn outside the womb). “It would be bizarre, indeed, to hold that the greater the harm inflicted the better the opportunity for exoneration of the defendant.”

Although Justice Lee assumed that it would be bizarre “to hold that the greater the harm inflicted the better the opportunity for exoneration,” I’m not certain that is so self-evident.  For example, the legislature could have reasonably (i.e., not bizarrely) concluded that, while it made sense to compensate parents of surviving children for medical expenses that would be incurred as a result of a prenatal injury, it made less sense to provide a means of compensation for parents when the child on whom a prenatal injury was inflicted did not survive the injury.  By creating a cause of action for prenatal injuries, the legislature could have been focused on ensuring that compensation was available to families who would have to incur the ongoing medical expenses in caring for an injured, but surviving, child.

The legislature could have further intended that any punishment meted out to a person causing such a prenatal injury would be through the criminal, rather than the civil, law and that the criminal sanctions would serve as a sufficient deterrent.  Or, distasteful as such a viewpoint is to me personally, the legislature could have concluded that a fetus is not a child and therefore totally outside of the protections of civil law unless and until it survived birth.  Finally, one could quite easily question Justice Lee’s implicit assumption that the Utah legislature enacted the wrongful death statute with the background knowledge that the “universal” rule provided for recovery for prenatal injuries, especially given that Justice Lee provided no evidence that this rule had been adopted in Utah as part of the statutory or common law.

None of this is to say that Justice Lee’s interpretation is incorrect.  But it does help show just how tricky this process of statutory interpretation can be.  Sometimes, when there are no definitive clues as to legislative intent in a specific situation, judges have to take their best shot at things amidst a lot of conflicting signals.  Because they are engaged in statutory interpretation, they aren’t free to just say, “Well, it might be this and it might be that, so I’m going for the one I like best.” (though this may sometimes happen, despite best efforts to the contrary).

Justice Nehring

Justice Nehring was the lone dissenter in this case and set out three reasons for his contrary interpretation of the wrongful death statute:

  1. The plain language of the statute referred only to children that survive birth.
  2. A cause of action for wrongful death requires clear direction from the legislature.
  3. Interpreting the wrongful death statute to apply to unborn children would lead to absurd results.

Points 1 and 3 of Justice Nehring’s opinion are unpersuasive.  His plain language argument suffers from the same fatal flaw as Chief Justice Durham’s — the statutory language is ambiguous, not plain.  His third point misses the mark because the absurd results he identifies only ensue if the majority definition of minor child is extrapolated to other largely unrelated statutes.

So, when I began to read Justice Nehring’s dissent, I brushed over points 1 and 3 and immediately latched on to point number 2 — which seems to have great potential to resolve this whole matter.  If this indeed is the judicial rule in Utah — that the courts have required the legislature to make a clear statement when creating a cause of action for wrongful death — the legislature hardly provided “clear direction” in its wrongful death statute.

Unfortunately, Justice Nehring’s opinion doesn’t live up the promising billing.  He cites to no judicial precedent requiring a clear statement from the legislature before courts will recognize a cause of action for wrongful death.  Rather, he simply offers his opinion that, had the legislature intended to create a cause of action for injuries to unborn children, it would have said so explicitly.

Even though he under delivers (never a good idea in legal argument, much less a judicial opinion), Justice Nehring makes an important point.  The Utah legislature has shown a tendency to use the modifier “unborn” to distinguish living persons/children from unborn persons/children.  Although Justice Nehring (inexplicably) does not cite to any specific examples of this usage, Justice Durham does the citing for him (see paragraphs 11 and 12 of the majority opinion).  All other things being equal, one could reasonably rely on this usage tendency as indirect evidence of legislative intent that the wrongful death cause of action is only available to parents of surviving children.

Some Thoughts

Ultimately, this is a case where it seems as though it may be impossible to conclusively determine legislative intent.  When confronted these types of cases, judges — although they speak with great certainty — are really just taking their best guess.  Ultimately, I come down with the majority in this case for two reasons.  First, Justice Lee’s reasoning regarding the asymmetry of treatment created by defining a “minor child” as a living child, though not decisive, is nonetheless forceful given the current language and common law backdrop.  Second, Justice Lee’s structural reasoning is strengthened by the statutory provisions cited by Chief Justice Durham stating that the legislative public policy of Utah is to protect the rights of all persons, even the unborn. In my opinion, these two points, taken together, outweigh Justice Nehring’s one strong counterpoint.

Regardless of your views on the merits of court’s opinion, this statute should be clarified in the upcoming legislative session.